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Winand Emons
Winand Emons
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Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Credence goods and fraudulent experts
W Emons
The RAND Journal of Economics 28, 107-119, 1997
6601997
Credence goods monopolists
W Emons
International Journal of Industrial Organization 19 (3-4), 375-389, 2001
2362001
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem
W Emons
Journal of Economic Theory 46 (1), 16-33, 1988
1711988
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort
W Emons
International Review of Law and Economics 20 (1), 21-33, 2000
1262000
The theory of warranty contracts
W Emons
Journal of Economic Surveys 3 (1), 43-57, 1989
1141989
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders
W Emons
International Review of Law and Economics 23 (3), 253-259, 2003
972003
US‐style contingent fees and UK‐style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services
W Emons, N Garoupa
Managerial and Decision Economics 27 (5), 379-385, 2006
94*2006
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders
W Emons
International Review of Law and Economics 27 (2), 170-178, 2007
902007
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon
W Emons, G Sheldon
Applied Economics 41, 2867-2885, 2009
87*2009
Conditional versus contingent fees
W Emons
Oxford Economic Papers 59 (1), 89-101, 2007
862007
On the limitation of warranty duration
W Emons
The Journal of Industrial Economics 37, 287-301, 1989
691989
Accuracy versus falsification costs: The optimal amount of evidence under different procedures
W Emons, C Fluet
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 25, 134-156, 2009
642009
On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical
W Emons, J Sobel
The Review of Economic Studies 58 (2), 375-390, 1991
601991
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals
W Emons
Journal of Public Economics 42 (1), 89-104, 1990
421990
Imperfect tests and natural insurance monopolies
W Emons
The Journal of Industrial Economics 49 (3), 247-268, 2001
372001
Playing it safe with low conditional fees versus being insured by high contingent fees
W Emons
American Law and Economics Review 8 (1), 20-32, 2006
322006
Subgame‐Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders
W Emons
Economic Inquiry 42 (3), 496-502, 2004
322004
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz
W Emons
Wirtschaftsdienst 81 (11), 664-668, 2001
312001
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality
W Emons, C Fluet
International Journal of Industrial Organization 30 (4), 352-360, 2012
302012
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration
W Emons
International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, 465-484, 1996
291996
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