Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A ‘state of the art’model R Midjord, TR Barraquer, J Valasek Games and Economic behavior 104, 430-443, 2017 | 28* | 2017 |
Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and collective reputation J Valasek Journal of Public Economics 168, 94-108, 2018 | 25* | 2018 |
Centralized fiscal spending by supranational unions J Simon, JM Valasek Economica 84 (333), 78-103, 2017 | 22* | 2017 |
Optimal decision rules in multilateral aid funds A Dreher, J Simon, J Valasek The Review of International Organizations 16, 689-719, 2021 | 17* | 2021 |
Political polarization and selection in representative democracies D Duell, J Valasek Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 168, 132-165, 2019 | 16 | 2019 |
A note on empathy in games J Grohn, S Huck, JM Valasek Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108, 383-388, 2014 | 16 | 2014 |
Strategic communication in committees with expressive payoffs Y Breitmoser, J Valasek The RAND Journal of Economics 55 (1), 33-54, 2024 | 13* | 2024 |
Get out the vote: How encouraging voting changes political outcomes JM Valasek Economics & Politics 24 (3), 346-373, 2012 | 13* | 2012 |
The Impact of Forced Migration on In-Group and Out-Group Social Capital A Hager, J Valasek | 6* | 2022 |
Institutionalizing Eurozone exit: A modified NEWNEY approach S Huck, JM Valasek WZB Discussion Paper, 2012 | 4 | 2012 |
When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives R Midjord, TR Barraquer, J Valasek Journal of Economic Theory 198, 105354, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
Why do committees work? Y Breitmoser, J Valasek NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
Fairness Preferences and Default Effects J Valasek, P Vorjohann, W Wang NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper 9, 2024 | | 2024 |
Underrepresentation, Quotas and Stigma: A dynamic argument for reform M Arve, J Valasek | | 2023 |