Dilation for sets of probabilities T Seidenfeld, L Wasserman The Annals of Statistics 21 (3), 1139-1154, 1993 | 211 | 1993 |

A representation of partially ordered preferences T Seidenfeld, MJ Schervish, JB Kadane The Annals of Statistics 23 (6), 2168-2217, 1995 | 176 | 1995 |

Philosophical problems of statistical inference: Learning from RA Fisher T Seidenfeld Springer Science & Business Media, 1979 | 166 | 1979 |

Decision theory without “independence” or without “ordering”: what is the difference? T Seidenfeld Economics & Philosophy 4 (2), 267-290, 1988 | 126 | 1988 |

On the shared preferences of two Bayesian decision makers T Seidenfeld, JB Kadane, MJ Schervish The Journal of Philosophy 86 (5), 225-244, 1989 | 123 | 1989 |

The extent of non-conglomerability of finitely additive probabilities MJ Schervish, T Seidenfeld, JB Kadane Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete 66 (2), 205-226, 1984 | 117 | 1984 |

State-dependent utilities MJ Schervish, T Seidenfeld, JB Kadane Journal of the American Statistical Association 85 (411), 840-847, 1990 | 116 | 1990 |

Why I am not an objective Bayesian; some reflections prompted by Rosenkrantz T Seidenfeld Theory and Decision 11 (4), 413-440, 1979 | 113 | 1979 |

Entropy and uncertainty T Seidenfeld Philosophy of Science 53 (4), 467-491, 1986 | 111 | 1986 |

Coherent choice functions under uncertainty T Seidenfeld, MJ Schervish, JB Kadane Synthese 172 (1), 157, 2010 | 85 | 2010 |

Statistical implications of finitely additive probability JB Kadane, MJ Schervish, T Seidenfeld Rethinking the foundations of statistics, 211, 1999 | 85 | 1999 |

Degrees of belief F Huber, C Schmidt-Petri Springer Science & Business Media, 2008 | 83 | 2008 |

Reasoning to a foregone conclusion JB Kadane, MJ Schervish, T Seidenfeld Journal of the American Statistical Association 91 (435), 1228-1235, 1996 | 75 | 1996 |

Decisions without ordering T Seidenfeld, MJ Schervish, JB Kadane Acting and reflecting, 143-170, 1990 | 73 | 1990 |

Calibration, coherence, and scoring rules T Seidenfeld Philosophy of Science 52 (2), 274-294, 1985 | 72 | 1985 |

RA Fisher's fiducial argument and Bayes' theorem T Seidenfeld Statistical Science 7 (3), 358-368, 1992 | 71 | 1992 |

Rethinking the foundations of statistics JB Kadane, MJ Schervish, T Seidenfeld Cambridge University Press, 1999 | 69 | 1999 |

A conflict between finite additivity and avoiding Dutch book T Seidenfeld, MJ Schervish Philosophy of Science 50 (3), 398-412, 1983 | 69 | 1983 |

Divisive conditioning: further results on dilation T Herron, T Seidenfeld, L Wasserman Philosophy of Science 64 (3), 411-444, 1997 | 68 | 1997 |

A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: γ-maximin versus E-admissibility T Seidenfeld Synthese 140 (1/2), 69-88, 2004 | 66 | 2004 |